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This address considers the epidemiology of narratives relevant to economic fluctuations.  The human brain 
has always been highly tuned towards narratives, whether factual or not, to justify ongoing actions, even such 
basic actions as spending and investing. Stories motivate and connect activities to deeply felt values and needs. 
Narratives “go viral” and spread far, even worldwide, with economic impact. The 1920-21 Depression, the 
Great Depression of the 1930s, the so-called “Great Recession” of 2007-9 and the contentious political-
economic situation of today, are considered as the results of the popular narratives of their respective times. 
Though these narratives are deeply human phenomena that are difficult to study in a scientific manner, 
quantitative analysis may help us gain a better understanding of these epidemics in the future.  
Robert J. Shiller 
Sterling Professor of Economics and Professor of Finance 
Cowles Foundation, Yale University  
30 Hillhouse Avenue 








By narrative economics I mean the study of the spread and dynamics of popular narratives, the 
stories, particularly those of human interest and emotion, and how these change through time, to 
understand economic fluctuations. A recession, for example, is a time when many people have decided to 
spend less, to make do for now with that old furniture instead of buying new, or to postpone starting a new 
business, to postpone hiring new help in an existing business, or to express support for fiscally conservative 
government. They might make any of these decisions in reaction to the recession itself (that’s feedback), but 
to understand why a recession even started, we need more than a theory of feedback. We have to consider 
the possibility that sometimes the dominant reason why a recession is severe is related to the prevalence and 
vividness of certain stories, not the purely economic feedback or multipliers that economists love to model. 
 The field of economics should be expanded to include serious quantitative study of changing 
popular narratives. To my knowledge, there has been no controlled experiment to prove the importance of 
changing narratives in causing economic fluctuations. We cannot easily prove that any association between 
changing narratives and economic outcomes is not all reverse causality, from the outcomes to the narratives. 
But there have been true controlled experiments showing that people respond strongly to narratives, in the 
fields of marketing (Escalas 2007); journalism (Machill et al. 2007 ); education (McQuiggan et al. 2008); 
health interventions (Slater et al. 2003); and philanthropy (Weber et al. 2006). 
 My goal in this paper is to describe what we know about narratives and the penchant of the human 
mind to be engaged by them, to consider reasons to expect that narratives might well be thought of as 
important, largely exogenous shocks to the aggregate economy. This address extends some earlier work I 
have done with George Akerlof (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009, 2015) and some of my own earlier work going 
back decades (Shiller 1984), but develops the analysis and captures a much broader relevant literature. 
Of course, almost nothing beyond spots on the sun is truly exogenous in economics, but new 
narratives may be regarded often as causative innovations, since each narrative originates in the mind of a 
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single individual (or a collaboration among a few).  Joel Mokyr (2016) calls such an individual a “cultural 
entrepreneur,” and traces the concept back to David Hume (1742) who wrote that “what depends on a few 
persons is, in great measure, to be ascribed to chance, or secret and unknown causes; what arises from a 
great number may often be accounted for by determinate and known causes.”1  
I will present here some thoughts on these effects of a “few persons” and offer a class of 
mathematical models for some of these determinate and known causes of the path of narratives, quantifying 
the dynamics of narratives, and will consider how our understanding can be enhanced of major economic 
events: the Depression of 1920-21, the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Great Recession of 2007-2009, 
and our present time right after our narrative-filled 2016 presidential election.  
I use the term narrative to mean a simple story or easily expressed explanation of events that many 
people want to bring up in conversation or on news or social media because it can be used to stimulate the 
concerns or emotions of others, and/or because it appears to advance self-interest. To be stimulating, it 
usually has some human interest either direct or implied. As I (and many others) use the term, a narrative is 
a gem for conversation, and may take the form of an extraordinary or heroic tale or even a joke. It is not 
generally a researched story, and may have glaring holes, as in “urban legends.”  The form of the narrative 
varies through time and across tellings, but maintains a core contagious element, in the forms that are 
successful in spreading. Why an element is contagious, when it may even “go viral,” may be hard to 
understand, unless we reflect carefully on the reason people like to spread the narrative. Mutations in 
narratives spring up randomly, just as in organisms in evolutionary biology, and when they are contagious, 
the mutated narratives generate seemingly unpredictable changes in the economy. 
Narratives can be based on varying degrees of truth. Wishful thinking may enhance contagion 
(Benabou 2013). The impact of non-factual narratives might be somewhat greater in today’s world than in 
decades past, since established news media are in upheaval after the relatively recent advent of modern 
1 Hume (1788) XIV p. 101. 
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information technology and social media. But in past decades we can also observe that narratives with no 
factual basis were widely disseminated and believed. For instance, until modern times, it was asserted that 
women were not capable of learning men’s occupations (Goldin 2014). Similarly, it was argued that some 
racial or ethnic groups were not really capable of integrating into civilized society (Myrdal, 1974). How 
people could believe these views in the past seems hard to imagine today because we are no longer 
immersed in their narratives.  
Disturbingly, the Oxford Dictionary in 2016 gave “post-truth” as “international word of the year.”2  
Are narratives becoming increasingly based on false ideas? This possibility is something we ought to try to 
understand better. Among normal people, narratives are often somewhat dishonest and manipulative. In a 
competitive market where competitors manipulate customers and profit margins have been competed away 
to normal levels, no one company can choose not to engage in similar manipulations. If they tried, they 
might be forced into bankruptcy. A phishing equilibrium with a certain equilibrium acceptable level of 
dishonesty in narrative is established (Akerlof and Shiller, 2015). 
The Role of Narratives Broadly, in the Social Sciences and the Humanities 
 
When we as economists want to understand the most significant economic events in our history, 
such as the Great Depression of the 1930’s, or subsequent recessions, or policies towards wealth and 
poverty, we rarely focus on the important narratives that accompanied them. We have lagged behind other 
disciplines in attending to the importance of narratives (Figure 1), and while all disciplines use narratives 
more since 2010, economics (and finance) remain laggards. This is despite calls for economists’ attention to 
“social dynamics” and “popular models” (Shiller 1984); to a new “culturnomics” (Michele 2005); or 
“humanomics” (McCloskey 2016); or for more “narrativeness” in economics (Morson and Schapiro 2017). 




                                                     
 
 
Figure 1. JSTOR counts by field of articles containing the word “narrative” as a percent of all articles in the field, entire 
database left and the years 2010-2016 only, right. 
 
 Some would say that the field of history has always had an appreciation for narratives. However, 
historians need also to be reminded sometimes that a deep understanding of history requires imputing what 
was on the minds of those people who made history, what their narratives were, as historian Ramsay 
MacMullen implored in his book, Feelings in History: Ancient and Modern (2003). He does not literally 
stress the concept of narratives: he has told me he would prefer a word conveying “stimulus to some 
emotional response, and there is no such word.” But he shows that if we try to understand people’s actions, 
we will need to replicate in ourselves as best we can the feelings they themselves experienced, and his book 
describes many of the narratives that in history communicated such feelings.  
In the social sciences, the last half century saw the blossoming of schools of thought that 
emphasized study of popular narratives,  a study that has been variously named as narrative psychology 
(Bruner 1986); storytelling sociology (Berger and Quinney 2004); narrative approaches to religious studies 
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(Ganzevoort 2013); narrative criminology (Presser and Sandberg 2015); and so on. The overriding theme is 
that people typically have little or nothing to say if you ask them to explain their objectives or philosophy of 
life, but they brighten up at the opportunity to tell personal stories, which then reveal much of their values 
(O’Conner 2000). For example, if one interviews in a prison, one finds that the subject tends to respond 
well when asked to tell stories about other criminals, and these stories tend to convey a sense not of 
amorality but of altered morality.  
Consideration of narratives in economics brings us to an unfamiliar association with literature 
departments in our universities. Some literary theorists have found that certain basic structures of stories are 
repeated constantly, though the names and circumstances change from story to story, perhaps suggesting 
that the human brain practically has receptors for certain stories built in. Cawelti (1976) classifies what he 
calls “formula stories.” Propp (1984) found 31 “functions” present in all folk stories. Tobias (1996) says that 
in all of fiction there are only twenty master plots: “quest, adventure, pursuit, rescue, escape, revenge, the 
riddle, rivalry, underdog, temptation, metamorphosis, transformation, maturation, love, forbidden love, 
sacrifice, discovery, wretched excess, ascension and descension.” Booker (2004) argues that there are only 
seven basic plots: “overcoming the monster, rags to riches, voyage and return, comedy, tragedy, and 
rebirth.” According to literary theorist Mary Klages (2006), structuralism in literary theory takes such efforts 
to list all basic stories as “overly reductive and dehumanizing.”3 Although dismissing these lists of basic plots, 
she asserts: “structuralists believe that the mechanisms which organize units and rules into meaningful 
systems come from the human mind itself.”4 Peter Brooks (1992) says narratology should be concerned 
with “how narratives work on us, as readers, to create models of understanding, and why we need and want 
such shaping orders.”5  Well-structured narratives, Brooks argues, “animate the sense-making process” and 
fulfill a “passion for meaning”6 and the study of narratives brings him to psychoanalysis.  
3 Klages p. 33 
4 Loc. Cit. 
5 Brooks (1992), location 74. 
6 Brooks, location 749. 
7 
 
                                                     
Narratives as Creative, Essentially Human, Works 
 
Predicting the success of creative works with the public is an extremely difficult task, one that is 
fundamentally related to the challenge we have in predicting contagion rates of narratives. We don’t 
precisely observe the mental and social processes that create contagion. For example, predicting the success 
of motion pictures before they are released is widely known to be quite difficult, (Litman 1983).  Jack 
Valenti, former president of the Motion Picture Association of America, said: 
“With all the experience, with all the creative instincts of the wisest people in our 
business, no one, absolutely no one can tell you what a movie is going to do in the 
marketplace. . . Not until the film opens in a darkened theater and sparks fly up between the 
screen and the audience can you say this film is right.”7  
 By analogy, the reason that writers pull quotes, especially paragraph-length quotes, and display 
them as I have just done is often to convey a narrative, to give the reader a historical sense of a past narrative 
that had impact and might again have impact on the reader if it is repeated just as it was perfectly worded. 
As with jokes, a narrative has to be delivered just right to be effective. Similarly, with music we want to hear 
again and again a performance that sounds exactly right and by the perfect performer. This is why narratives 
are difficult to study, and why there are limitations in textual analysis involving word counts or n-gram 
counts to quantify and study them. 
Since around the beginning of the twentieth century, scholars from a wide array of disciplines began 
to think that narratives, stories that seem outwardly to be of entertainment value only, are really central to 
human thinking and motivation.  For example, in 1938 the existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre wrote: 
“A man is always a teller of tales, he lives surrounded by his stories and the stories of 
others, he sees everything that happens to him through them; and he tries to live his life as if 
he were recounting it.”   
7 Jack Valenti, in a speech “Motion Pictures and Their Impact on Society in the Year 2001,” April 25, 1978, quoted in 
Litman (1983) p. 159 
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The tales tend to have human interest, if only suggested. By analogy, when asleep at night, narratives 
appear to us in the form of dreams. We do not dream of equations or geometric figures without some 
human element. Neuroscientists have described dreaming, which involves characters, settings, and a 
hierarchical event structure, as a story-telling instinct that resembles in brain activity a form of 
spontaneous confabulation caused by lesions of the anterior limbic system and its subcortical 
connections (Pace-Schott, 2013). 
Anthropologists, who conduct research on the behavior of diverse tribes around the world, have 
observed a “universal” that people “use narrative to explain how things came to be and to tell stories” 
(Brown 1991). Visitors to any human society will observe people facing each other, sitting around the 
television – or the campfire - together, and vocalizing, and more recently, tweeting, stories, at the same 
time waiting to learn other’s reactions, interested in feedback that will either confirm or disconfirm one’s 
thoughts.  It seems that the human mind strives to reach enduring understanding of events by forming 
them into a narrative that is imbedded in social interactions.   
Some have suggested that it is stories that most distinguish us from animals, and even that our 
species be called Homo narrans (Fisher 1984) or Homo narrator (Gould 1994) or Homo narrativus 
(Ferrand and Weil 2001) depending on whose Latin we use.  Might this be a more accurate description 
than Homo sapiens, i.e., wise man? It is more flattering to think of ourselves as Homo sapiens, but not 
necessarily more accurate. 
It is important to note that narratives may not generally be acted upon reflectively, since, in the 
words of psychologists Schank and Abelson (1977), they may be taken as scripts. When in doubt as to how 
to behave in an ambiguous situation, people may think back to narratives and adopt a role as if acting in a 
play they have seen before. The narratives have the ability to produce social norms that partially govern our 
activities, including our economic actions. 
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Popular narratives may have a spirit of “us versus them,” a Manichean tone of revealed evil 
described of others in the story. Jokes are quite often at somebody else’s expense - members of some other 
group. In extreme cases, they may be focused on events as evidence of some kind of imagined conspiracy.  
Of course, it is rational for people to be alert to conspiracies, since history is filled with actual 
examples of them. But the human mind seems to have a built-in interest in conspiracies, a tendency to form 
a personal identity and loyalty to friends built around perceived plots of others. This disposition appears to 
be related to human patterns of reciprocity, of vengeance against presumed enemies, a tendency that has 
been found relevant to economic behavior (Fehr and Gächter 2000). The disposition may be amplified 
individually by brain damage, into a “paranoid personality disorder” that is recognized in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual, Fifth Edition (DSM V) of the American Psychiatric Association as afflicting 2.3% to 4.4% 
of the U.S. adult population.8   
There is a daunting amount in the scholarly literature about narratives, in a number of academic 
departments, and associated concepts of memetics, norms, social epidemics, contagion of ideas. While 
we may never be able to explain why some narratives “go viral” and significantly influence thinking while 
other narratives do not, we would be wise to add some analysis of what people are talking about if we are 
to search for the source of economic fluctuations. We economists should not just throw up our hands 
and decide to ignore this vast literature. We need to understand the narrative basis for macroeconomic 
fluctuations, and to think about how narrative economics ought to be more informing of policy actions 
now and in the future. 
Narratives are major vectors of rapid change in culture, in zeitgeist, and ultimately in economic 
behavior. Spreading narratives, often many parallel narratives around a common theme, have been creating 
8 The American Psychiatric Association has discontinued in DSM V the term “paranoid schizophrenia” and other 
terms describing paranoid forms of other psychotic disorders. Those who were once diagnosed paranoid 
schizophrenic might today have two diagnoses at once: paranoid personality disorder and schizophrenia. 
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cultural change long before the Internet revolution, when the appearance of the parallel phenomenon of 
computer viruses, which spread by contagion from computer to computer, popularized the virus metaphor.  
Talk of the epidemic spread of narratives goes back centuries. David Hume wrote in 1742: 
“. . . when any causes beget a particular inclination or passion, at a certain time and among a 
certain people, though many individuals may escape the contagion, and be ruled by passions 
peculiar to themselves; yet the multitude will certainly be seized by the common affection, and 
be governed by it in all their actions.”9 
Charles McKay drew attention to the contagious spread of “extraordinary popular delusions” 
(1841).  Gustave Le Bon said in his book Psychologie des foules (The Crowd): “Ideas, sentiments, 
emotions, and beliefs possess in crowds a contagious power as intense as that of microbes” (Le Bon 1895). 
Related terms were collective consciousness (Durkheim 1897), collective memory (Halbwachs 1920s), 
memes (Dawkins 1976). Contagion is also related to issues of identity, since an important part of most 
narratives describing past events involving people is that one must imagine oneself as another person, and 
thus momentarily at least feel a shared identity with someone else (Akerlof and Kranton 2011). 
Dimensions of Narratives Normal and Abnormal 
 
The psychologist Jerome Bruner, who has stressed the importance of narratives, wrote that we 
should not assume that human actions are ever driven in response to purely objective facts:  
“I do not believe that facts ever quite stare anybody in the face. From a psychologist’s 
point of view, that is not how facts behave, as we well know from our studies of perception, 
memory, and thinking. Our factual worlds are more like cabinetry carefully carpentered than 
like a virgin forest inadvertently stumbled upon.”10 
Narratives are human constructs that are mixtures of fact and emotion and human interest and other 
extraneous detail that form an impression on the human mind.  
9 Hume (1788) p. 103. 
10 Bruner (1998) p. 18. 
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Psychiatrists and psychologists recognize that mental illness is often an extreme form of normal 
behavior, or a narrow disruption of normal human mental faculties. So we can learn about the complexities 
of normal human narrative brain processing by looking at dysnarrativia, abnormal narrative phenomena. 
Neuroscientists Young and Saver (2001) listed some of its varied forms:  arrested narration, undernarration, 
denarration, confabulation.  
Schizophrenia may be regarded as another brain anomaly related to narrative problems (Gaser et 
al. 2004). Schizophrenia has aspects of being a disorder of narrative, as it often involves the hearing of 
imaginary voices delivering a fantastic, and disordered, narrative (Saavedra et al. 2009). Hearing voices as a 
symptom of schizophrenia is correlated with volume deficits in specific brain areas (Gaser et al. 2004). The 
narrative disruption found in autism spectrum disorder also is related to brain anomalies (Losh and Gordon 
2014), (Pierce et al. 2001).  
Narrative psychology is also related to the psychologists’ concept of framing (Kahneman and 
Tversky 2000), Thaler (2015, 2016). If we can create an amusing story that will get retold, it can establish a 
point of view, a reference point, which will have influence on decisions. It is also related to the Kahneman 
and Tversky representativeness heuristic (1973), whereby people form their expectations based on similarity 
of circumstance to some idealized story or model, and tend to neglect base-rate probabilities. 
 Psychologists have noted an affect heuristic, whereby people who are experiencing strong 
emotions, such as fear, tend to extend their feelings to unrelated happenings (Slovic et al. 2007). Sometimes 
people note strong emotions or fears about possibilities that they know logically are not real, suggesting that 
the brain has multiple systems for assessing risk, and the “risk as feelings” hypothesis that some primitive 
brain system more connected to palpable emotions has its own heuristic for assessing risk (Lowenstein et al. 
2001.)  
In joint work with William Goetzmann and Dasol Kim (2016), using data from a questionnaire 
survey I have been conducting with institutional investors and high-income Americans since 1989, we found 
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that these people generally have exaggerated assessments of the risk of a stock market crash, and that these 
assessments are influenced by the news stories, especially front page stories, that they read. One intriguing 
finding was that an event such as an earthquake could influence estimations of the likelihood of a stock 
market crash. The respondents in our survey gave statistically significantly higher probabilities to a stock 
market crash if there had been an earthquake within 30 miles of their zip code within 30 days, triggering the 
affect heuristic. It seems reasonable to hypothesize that local earthquakes start local narratives with negative 
emotional valence. Analogous evidence has been found of seemingly irrelevant events with narrative 
potential having effects on economic or political outcomes: the effect of World Cup outcomes on economic 
confidence (Dohmen et al. 2006,) and of background music in advertisements on viewers (Boltz et al. 
1991). 
The news media, for which the survival of any one organization is never assured in a competitive 
news marketplace, must become adept at managing the news to make narratives work in their favor. 
Moreover, news media embellish the emphasized news with human interest stories. Given the large and 
often dramatic degree of news media coverage of disasters – natural and man-made – and of crimes and 
human interest stories, it seems clear that news media believe that covering such events will result in 
increased sales and attention for their news products. However, little attention has been given to the impact 
of such news stories on other stories in the same publication. 
Epidemic Models 
The Kermack-McKendrick (1927) mathematical theory of disease epidemics marked a revolution 
in medical thinking because it gave a realistic framework for understanding the all-important dynamics of 
infectious diseases. Their simplest model divided the population into three compartments: susceptibles, 
infectives, and recovereds, hence it is called an SIR Model or compartmental model. S is the number of 
susceptibles, people who have not had the disease and are vulnerable. I is the number of infectives, people 
who have the disease and are actively spreading it. R is the number of recovereds, who have had the disease 
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and gotten over it and are no longer capable of catching the disease again or spreading it. The total 
population N=S+I+R is assumed constant.  
The key idea of the Kermack-McKendrick mathematical theory of disease epidemics was that in a 
thoroughly mixing population the rate of increase of infectives in a disease epidemic is equal to a constant 
contagion rate c>0 times the product of the number of susceptibles S and the number of infectives I minus 
a constant recovery rate r>0 times the number of infectives. Each time a susceptible meets an infective there 
is a chance of infection. The number of such meetings per unit of time depends on the number of 
susceptible-infective pairs in the population. The recovery from the disease is assumed for simplicity to 
occur in an exponential decay fashion, instead of the more usual notion of a relatively fixed timetable for 










The same SIR model can of course be used to describe the word-of-mouth transmission of an idea. 
Here, the contagion rate is the fraction of the time that an encounter between an infective, a person 
interested in and accepting of a story, effectively convinces the susceptible enough of the story to spread it 
further.  Many encounters may be needed before a particular person is infected. The removal rate might be 
described as the rate of forgetting, of simple decay of memories, but there is also cue-dependent forgetting. 
This removal also occurs as the repertory of other current stories evolves away from this story, so that there 
are declining cues for the memory; this story seems less connected, less apt, or even superficially contrary to 
current theories and prejudices. It might be plausible to suppose, as the model does, that contagion rates 
and removal rates are both constant through time, if they are intrinsic to the narrative. Inaccurate retellings 
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of the narrative that leave out its essential interest value, because of transmission error, just don’t survive, the 
parameter c refers to successful spread of the core interest value of a story. 
Even though direct face-to-face communications of ideas is less important in modern times because 
of the communications media, it still remains a workable model. The core model may apply no matter how 
people may connect with each other.  
This model implies that from a small number of initial infectives, the number infected and 
contagious itself follows a bell-shaped curve, rising at first, then falling. A mutation in an old much-reduced 
disease may produce a single individual who is infective, and then there will be a lag, possible a long lag if c 
is small, before the disease has infected enough people to be noticed in public. The epidemic will then rise 
to a peak, and then fall and come to an end without any change in the infection or removal rates, and before 
everyone is infected. 
 
Figure 2. Solution to Kermack-McKendrick SIR model for N=100, I0=1 c=.005, r=.05. 
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Figure 2 shows an example, implied by the above three equations, with N=100 people, very small 
transmission of infection per unit of time on any one exposure, I0=1 c=.005, r=.05. In this case, almost 100% 
of the population eventually gets infected. During an actual epidemic, public attention tends to focus on the 
number of infectives, seen here as a bell-shaped curve skewed to the right. 
Not everyone will ever catch the disease as some completely escape for lack of effective encounter 
with an infective, and gradually it gets safer and safer for them because the infectives are becoming more 
and more reduced in number as they get over the disease and are immune to it, so there are not enough 
new encounters to generate sufficient new infectives to keep the disease on the growth path. Eventually, the 
infectives almost disappear, and the population consists almost entirely of susceptibles and recovereds. 
   What creates a big disease that ultimately reaches a lot of people (the total ever infected and 
recovered as measured by R∞)? It is a function of the ratio c/r of the two parameters. As time goes to 
infinity, the number of people who have ever had the disease goes to a limit R∞ (called the size of the 
epidemic) strictly less than N. It follows directly from the first and third equations that dS/dR=-(c/r)S and 
the initial condition I0 that 𝑑𝑑 = (𝑁𝑁 − 𝑐𝑐0)𝑒𝑒







If we could choose c and r, we could make the size of the epidemic R∞ anything we want between I0 and N. 
Higher c/r corresponds to higher size of epidemic R∞, regardless of the level of c or of r, while higher c 
itself, holding c/r constant, yields a faster epidemic. If we define “going viral” by R∞ > N/2, then we see this 
happening in this example when c/r  > .014. 
 If we multiply both parameters, c and r, by any constant a, then the same equations are satisfied by 
S(at), I(at), R(at). This means, depending on the two parameters c and r, that there can be both fast and 
slow epidemics that look identical if the plot is rescaled. If we also vary the ratio c/r, we can have epidemics 
that play out over days and reach 95% of the population, or epidemics that play out over decades and reach 
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95% of the population, or epidemics that play out over days and reach only 5% of the population, or 
epidemics that play out over decades and reach 5% of the population. But in each case, we can have hump-
shaped patterns of infectives that on rescaling look something like that in Figure 2.  
The Kermack-McKendrick SIR model (1927) has formed a starting point for mathematical models 
of epidemics that have, over 90 years since, produced a huge literature. The basic compartmental model, 
the SIR model, has been modified to allow for gradual loss of immunity, so that recovereds are gradually 
transformed into susceptibles again (the SIRS model). This is the same as the SIR model above except that 
a term +sR is added to the right hand side of the first equation and –sR to the right hand side of the third 
equation, where s>0 is a re-susceptibility rate. In this model the infectives’ path may, depending on 
parameters, look similar to that in Figure 2 but approaching a nonzero horizontal asymptote as time 
increases: the infectives never effectively disappear. The SIR model can also be modified so that an 
encounter between a susceptible and an infected leads to an increase in exposed E, a fourth compartment, 
who become infective later (the SEIR model). The model has also been modified to incorporate partial 
immunity after cure, birth of new susceptibles, the presence of superspreaders with very high 
contagiousness, geographical patterns of spread, etc.  
Applications of the Kermack-McKendrick to Social Epidemics 
In applying the compartmental model to social epidemics, to epidemics of ideas, certain changes 
seem natural. One thought is that the contagion rate should decline with time, as the idea becomes 
gradually less exciting. Another way of modeling approximately the same notion is due to Daley and 
Kendall (1964, 1965) who said that the Kermack-McKendrick model could be altered to represent that 
infectious people might tend to become uninfectious after they meet another infectious person or a 
recovered person, because they then think that many people now know the story, making it no longer new 
and exciting, and thus they choose not to spread the epidemic further.  
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Bartholomew (1982) argued that when variations of the Kermack-McKendrick model are applied 
to the spread of ideas, we should not assume that ceasing to infect others and forgetting are the same thing. 
Human behavior might be influenced by an old idea not talked about much but still remembered. This has 
been called “behavioral residue” (Berger, 2013).  
There is now a substantial economics literature on network models, see the recent Handbook on 
Network Economics (Bramoullé 2016), though there appears to be little in the way of such behavioral 
models (the word narrative does not appear even once in the Handbook). Some of these modified SIR 
Models involve complex patterns of outcomes, and sometimes cycles.  Geographic models of spread are 
increasingly complicated by worldwide social media connections (Bailey et al. 2016).  
Some SIR models (surveyed in Lamberson 2016) dispense with replacing the idea of random 
mixing and choose instead a network structure.  There may be strategic decisions whether or not to allow 
oneself to be infected, and the fraction of the population infected may enter into the decision (Jackson and 
Yariv 2005). There are variations of models that describe individuals as adopting a practice not merely 
through random infection but through rational calculations of the information transmitted through their 
encounters with others (Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch. 1992). 
Currently, there is not any one single model for social epidemics, instead there is a tool bag of 
models for understanding epidemics depending on their circumstances. But we can still refer to the original 
Kermack-McKendrick SIR model as a metaphor for the class of dynamic models that rely on contagion and 
recovery. These other models typically still take analogues of c and r as fundamental parameters, still have 
the property that a slight tweak of c upwards or r downwards may set in motion a chain of events that sets 
off an epidemic with a lag, so that on the date the epidemic is first publicly noticed, the causes are now in 
fairly distant history and hard to discern.  
Even though direct face-to-face communication of ideas is less important in modern times, because 
of the communications media, the Kermack-McKendrick model still remains an important model for 
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economics. The core model may apply no matter what way people may connect with each other. There is a 
concern that modern communications media (the press, the Internet, etc.) make the SIR model less 
accurate in describing social epidemics. But the change may instead be roughly within the framework of the 
model, with higher contagion rates for narratives due to the social media automatically directing narratives 
to people with likely interest in them, regardless of their geography. Moreover, marketing literature finds 
that direct word-of-mouth communications still beat other forms in persuasiveness (Herr et al. 1991), and 
the marketing profession has responded by promoting word-of-mouth seeding strategies and television ads 
that feature actors portraying people with whom the common person can identify and simulating direct 
interpersonal word of mouth. In considering whether the Internet and social media and the SIR model, 
Zhao et al. (2013) argue for a modified SIR model where analogues to the parameters c and r are both 
increased by the new media.  
Bauckhage (2011) showed evidence that the SIRS variant of the Kermack-McKendrick 
compartmental model fits time series data reasonably well on Internet memes from Google Insights (now 
Google Trends.) He looked at silly recent Internet viruses like the “O RLY?” (Oh, really?) meme that 
displayed nothing more than a picture of a cute owl with what would appear to be a puzzled facial 
expression. Because the memes are largely nonsensical, we might expect them to follow a course 
independent of other ideas and thus to fit the SIRS model well, as he found. Roughly the same hump-
shaped pattern of infectives was found again and again. 
Michele et al. (2011) showed evidence that mentions of famous people in books tends to follow a 
hump-shaped pattern through time, a slow epidemic, something like those observed by Bauckhage, but over 
decades, rather than months or years. Some examples from economists possibly illustrate a compartmental 
model slow epidemic, a hump shaped pattern that plays out over centuries. Adam Smith (1723-1790) has a 
Google Ngrams plot that did not peak until the 1880s, and has since been declining slowly for over a 
century. Karl Marx (1818-1883) has a Google Ngrams plot that did not peak until the 1970s. 
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Taking the Kermack-McKendrick model as an illustration or metaphor, it would appear that this 
learning theory might imply that the total impact of an idea is measured by its R∞ long after the idea has 
ceased to be infectious. The long-run impact of an idea then is not testimony to its correctness, but rather to 
the c/r in the initial epidemic that popularized it. 
In applying the SIR model to social epidemics, we need also consider that narratives affect the 
contagion rates of other narratives that are seen to be on the same topic or that further inform. One new 
narrative may remind of another that has been lying fairly dormant. A wave of similar narrative epidemics 
can appear.  
One must also consider that stories tend to be strategic, fine-tuned by politicians, advertisers, or 
other interested parties (Akerlof and Shiller, 2015). People with an aptitude for storytelling see great fortune 
in monkeying with stories in an effort to have them go viral. Falk and Tirole (2016) call them “narrative 
entrepreneurs.” Glaeser (2005) refers to the “supply of stories,” exemplified by hate-creating stories crafted, 
produced, fashioned for political advantage. Gino et al. (2016) describe concoctors of excuses “motivated 
Bayesians” meaning that these people start to believe the fake news that they generated for self-advantage.  
Much of the purposeful generation of new stories is for individual profit, but some of it is done in a 
patriotic attempt to support confidence and good values. The process of perfecting stories is one of trial and 
error, and responsiveness to the kinds of things that go viral. A successful story entrepreneur may have a 
lifetime of failed attempts and perhaps only one or a few breakthroughs. The rare breakthroughs make the 
entire enterprise worthwhile. 
Narrative Epidemics of Economic Theories 
 Let us consider as an example the narrative epidemic associated with the Laffer Curve, a diagram 
created by economist Arthur Laffer in the theory of public finance. Let’s curve the curve, look at Kermack-
McKendrick curves for the narrative of the Laffer Curve. Looking at the Laffer Curve is an arbitrary choice 
among a vast number of narratives, but one that can be searched on databases easily since the name “Laffer 
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Curve” appears to connect well to a single narrative with clear economic impact. This narrative exploded 
into public attention in 1978 focusing on a 1974 event involving the U.S. economist Art Laffer. In Figure 
3, a plot of the frequency of references to the Laffer Curve by year, from ProQuest News & Newspapers 
and by Google Ngrams, somewhat resembles the infectives plot of the Kermack-McKendrick model in 
Figure 2.   
 
              
Figure 3.  Frequency of appearance of “Laffer Curve” by year. For news and newspapers (1950-2016, from 
ProQuest) it is the number of articles with this phrase as a percent of all articles that year. For books (1950-
2008, from Google Ngrams) it is the number of occurrences of “Laffer Curve” divided by the total number 
of words in the database for that year, in percent. 
  
For both, the curves are choppy relative to the model, due to some publication noise, but show 
some of the hump shape. For news and newspapers, the frequency of use of the term “Laffer Curve” 
initially rises strongly, from 1977 to 1978, and then rises rapidly for three more years, peaking in 1981. 
Then it falls and continues to fall for many years, as in the model Figure 2, though it shows something of an 
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upturn again after 2000. For books, the curve rises more slowly, for five of six consecutive years, from 1978 
to 1983, before entering a long period of slow decline, as in the model Figure 2.  
The Laffer Curve owes much of its contagion to the fact that it was seen as justifying major tax cuts. 
The Laffer Curve’s contagion related to fundamental political changes associated with Ronald Reagan’s 
election as U.S. president in 1980 with his commitment to cutting taxes (and with Margaret Thatcher, but 
not the socialist François Mitterrand elected around that time). 
The Laffer Curve is an inverted U curve relating tax revenue to tax rates, a theory that was used to 
justify cutting taxes on high-income people since high taxes incentivize them to produce less. The notion 
that taxes might reduce the incentive to earn income and create jobs was hardly new: the idea was expressed 
as long ago as Adam Smith in the eighteenth century.11 Andrew Mellon, U.S. Treasury Secretary, 1921-32, 
was famous for his “trickle down” economics, and, along with U.S. President Calvin Coolidge, 1923-9, 
successfully argued for reduction of income taxes that had remained high for a while after World War I. 
But then the Mellon name began to fade (outside of Carnegie-Mellon University), and the theory lost 
persuasive narrative.  
The story of the Laffer Curve did not go viral in 1974, the reputed date when Laffer first 
introduced it. Its contagion is explained by a literary innovation that was first published in a 1978 article in 
National Affairs by Jude Wanniski, editorial writer for the Wall Street Journal. Wanniski wrote the colorful 
story about Laffer sharing a steak dinner at the Two Continents in Washington D.C. in 1974 with top 
White House powers Dick Cheney12  and Donald Rumsfeld13, as well as Wanniski. Laffer drew his curve on 
a napkin at the restaurant table.  When news about the “curve drawn on a napkin” came out, with 
Wanniski’s help, this story surprisingly went viral, so much so that it is now commemorated.  A napkin with 
11 Adam Smith Wealth of Nations Vol. II (1869) [A tax] may obstruct the industry of the people, and discourage them 
from applying to certain branches of business which might give maintenance and employment to great multitudes.” P. 
416. 
12 Cheney was as of 1978 soon to be White House Chief of Staff, later Secretary of Defense and Vice President of the 
United States. 
13 Rumsfeld was as of 1978 recently secretary of Defense. 
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the Laffer Curve can be seen at the National Museum of American History, and a reenactment video of the 
restaurant-napkin event depicting Laffer drawing his curve on a napkin is available on Bloomberg.  
Why did this story go viral? It is always hard to explain these things. Laffer himself said after the 
Wanniski story exploded that he could not even remember the event, which had taken place four years 
earlier.14 But Wanniski was a journalist who sensed that he had the right elements of a good story. The key 
idea as Wanniski presented it, is indeed punchy: At a zero-percent tax rate, the government collects no 
revenue. At a 100% tax rate the government would also collect no revenue, because people will not work if 
all of the income is taken. Between the two extremes, the curve, relating tax revenue to tax rate, must have 
an inverted U shape. Now, as Wanniski pointed out with fanfare in the opening line of his 1978 article, this 
means that for any feasible tax revenue except one at the very top of the Laffer Curve, there are two tax 
rates that will generate this U shape, one at the left with a high-income level and low tax rates, the other at 
the right with a low-income level and high tax rates.  
Here is a notion of economic efficiency easy enough for anyone to understand. Wanniski 
suggested, without any data, that we are on the inefficient side of the Laffer Curve. Laffer’s genius was in 
narratives, not data collection. The drawing of the Laffer Curve seems to suggest that cutting taxes would 
produce a huge windfall in national income. To most quantitatively-inclined people unfamiliar with 
economics, this explanation of economic inefficiency was a striking concept, contagious enough to go viral, 
even though economists protested that we are not actually on the inefficient declining side of the Laffer 
Curve (Mirowski 1982). It is apparently impossible to capture why it is doubtful that we are on the 
inefficient side of the Laffer Curve in so punchy a manner that it has the ability to stifle the epidemic. Years 
later Laffer did refer broadly to the apparent effects of historic tax cuts (Laffer 2004); but in 1978 the 
14 Paul Blustein, 1981. “New Economics: Supply-Side Theories Became Federal Policy with Unusual Speed.” The 
Wall Street Journal. October 8, 1981, p. 1. 
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narrative dominated. To tell the story really well one must set the scene at the fancy restaurant, with the 
powerful Washington people and the napkin. 
   Another fad, associated with multiple narratives, appeared around the same time as the Laffer 
Curve: “Rubik’s Cube.” Rubik’s Cube was bigger than Laffer Curve on ProQuest News and Newspapers, 
but smaller than Laffer Curve on Google Ngrams. They both show similar hump-shaped paths through 
time.  
 
Figure 4. Google Ngrams counts for four economic theories: IS-LM (Hicks 1937), Multiplier-Accelerator (Samuelson 
1939), Overlapping Generations Model (Samuelson 1958) and Real Business Cycle model (Kydland and Prescott, 
1982).  
 
The Laffer Curve epidemic was followed during the Reagan presidency (1981-89) by a reduction in 
the top U.S. federal income tax bracket from 70% to 28%. The top-bracket U.S. corporate profits tax rate 
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was cut from 46% to 34% during the Reagan administration. The top U.S. capital gains tax rate was reduced 
from 28% to 20% in 1981 (though raised back to 28% again in 1987 during the Reagan presidency). If the 
Laffer Curve epidemic had even a minor effect on these changes, it must have had tremendous impact on 
measures of output and prices. 
Figure 4 shows Google Ngrams results for several other examples of economic theories, though less 
appropriate for our purposes because they are not just narratives, they are more substantively original than 
the Laffer Curve. Still, even important original theories have associated narratives and might have SIR 
dynamics. The IS-LM model (Hicks 1937); the multiplier-accelerator model (Samuelson 1939); the 
overlapping generations model (Samuelson 1958); and the real business cycle model (Kydland and Prescott, 
1982); all show hump-shaped patterns akin to those that can be produced by the Kermack-McKendrick 
model, as seen in Figure 2. In three of the cases, the epidemic first became visible more than a decade after 
the model was introduced, a phenomenon that is also explainable within the Kermack-McKendrick 
framework, where epidemics may go unobserved for a while after they have just started from very small 
beginnings. 
Feedback Variations: Multipliers and Bubbles 
 
  To think of the events surrounding the explosion of the Laffer Curve as a social epidemic is to 
think about feedback. The original Kahn-Keynes multiplier model in macroeconomics (Kahn 1931, Keynes 
1936) with its famous “multiple rounds of expenditure” might be described as a sort of epidemic model but 
with the contagion rate c replaced by MPC, the Marginal Propensity to Consume, and with a zero removal 
rate r. It was an appealing feedback model, on paper. Any stimulus to the economy, call it I0 to show 
parallel with our epidemic model, increases someone’s income. This individual, who then spends MPC of 
that income, generating income for yet another who spends MPC of that income, and so on, such that 
national income rises gradually, and eventually the result is an increase of national income of I0/(1-MPC).  
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In practice, however, the purely Keynesian form of contagion is limited. Some estimates of the 
multiplier are very low, implying that this kind of contagion may not be as important as it seemed at first. 
The “permanent income hypothesis” suggests that Keynesian contagion may be very low if people do not 
believe that the spurt in income will be permanent. Some research supports low multipliers, for example 
Matthew Shapiro (2016) reports on research of his own and of co-authors, based on survey questions 
conducted by the University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers, of the impact of fiscal stimulus policies. 
The presented counterfactuals (what would you have done differently if you did not receive the tax rebate 
check) and found that, at least at the time of their survey, the marginal propensity to consume may have 
been quite low, between one quarter and one third, suggesting a multiplier little different from one.  
A different special kind of epidemic model describes speculative bubbles. Speculative asset prices 
themselves would not generally be well modeled directly in terms of this model since the model yields 
smooth-through-time paths. Most speculative asset prices are nearly random walks on a day-to-day basis. 
The reason is obvious: if it were possible for smart money to predict the day-to-day price changes even 
reasonably well, they could become rich very fast, and they would take over the market. There are both 
smart money and noise traders in the market, the former attempting to predict the latter.15 There is a large 
literature on value investing that confirms that there has been a long-term return to doing it.16 
In a bubble, the contagion is altered by the public attention to price increases: rapid price increases 
boost the contagion rate of popular stories justifying that increase, heightening demand and more price 
increases. In a stock market bubble, these might be stories of the companies with glamorous new 
technology and of the people who created the technology. In a housing bubble, these might be stories of 
15 There is a substantial literature on “noise traders” in finance, see for example LeRoy and Porter (1981), Shiller 
(1981, 1984), Summers (1986), De Long, Shleifer Summers and Waldman (1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1997).  





                                                     
clever people making a fortune flipping houses. There can also be price-to-GDP-to-price feedback, if 
speculative price increases stimulate purchases and hence more increases, price-to-corporate profits-to-price 
feedback, and price-to-regulatory laxity-to-price feedback, all mediated by changing narratives (Shiller 1984, 
2000, 2015). 
 The impact of the epidemic on the asset return would depend on the speed of the epidemic 
relative to the discount rate. If the speed is very low, there would be very little impact on short-term returns. 
Then the asset price changes would find little short-term serial correlation through time, and would be 
approximately a random walk over short time periods.  
Narratives during the sharpest (though not the worst) U.S. contraction ever: 1920 to 1921. In 
looking for the narrative basis of economic recessions, which might be hard to see since narratives are not 
easy to measure, it would appear that we would have the most luck looking at really big ones: 1920-21 was 
the sharpest U.S. recession since modern statistics are available. The U.S. Consumer Price Index switched 
suddenly from inflation to deflation: between June of 1920 and June of 1921, during the Depression, it fell 
16%, the sharpest one-year deflation ever experienced in the United States. The Index of Wholesale Prices 
fell much more: 45% over the same time interval, its sharpest decline ever.17 The cyclically adjusted price 
earnings ratio (real S&P Composite Index divided by ten-year average of real earnings, Campbell and 
Shiller 1988) fell to 4.78 by December 1920, by far the lowest ratio in the entire history of the U.S. stock 
market since 1871. In contrast, note that the ratio is currently around 28.  The conventional price-earnings 
ratio with 12-month trailing earnings was also extremely low, at 8.51. This was the recession that, because of 
its severity, influenced the fledgling National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) towards a research 
program emphasizing the study and dating of business cycles. 
17 St. Louis Fed Fred II M04049USM052NNBR, source: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
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Surprisingly, the online NBER Working Paper Series, almost a hundred years later, when 
searched, has virtually nothing to say about what caused this spectacular depression. Why, after all, did it 
happen? 
Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, in their Monetary History of the United States, have given 
the most influential account. According to them, the 1920-21 contraction has a single identifiable cause: an 
error made by the fledgling Federal Reserve to raise the discount rate to trim out-of-bounds inflation in 
1919 caused by their carelessly over-expansionary policy right after World War I, leading to a necessity to 
take strong measures against inflation in 1920. Benjamin Strong, the president of the New York Fed, was on 
a long cruise starting December 1919, and was unable to prevent Federal Reserve Banks (which did not 
coordinate their policies with each other so much back then) from raising the discount rate as much as a full 
percentage point in one shot in January 1920. 
The Fed was new then, having opened its doors only in 1914, and so it is not surprising that they 
could have made mistakes and implemented overly strong swings in policy. But let us not jump to 
conclusions about the Fed having caused the depression. Other remarkable things were going on too. If we 
are going to single out significant events for study, we should keep in mind that important events are usually 
the result of the confluence of many factors, and often changing narratives are at work in those factors. 
There was a background then of horrible recent events: World War I, which ended only 14 
months before the start of the depression, an influenza epidemic even more deadly than the war that started 
during the war and was not quite over, and a series of postwar race riots in the United States. But how did 
these events translate into current narratives in 1920?  
I am reminded of a book about the 1920s, Only Yesterday: An Informal History of the 1920s, 
written by a popular writer, Frederick Lewis Allen, published in 1931, which commented on the early stages 
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of the Great Depression in its Afterword.18 His history emphasizes all the little silly fads and diversions that 
occupied people’s attentions, and might be considered a history of silliness, except that some of the events 
portrayed were ominous or deadly. 
 The 1920-21 recession also began with the early stages of widespread public fear of Communism. 
A computer search of news and newspapers on ProQuest shows relatively little use of the term Communist 
before 1919. Certainly, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote their Communist Manifesto long before, in 
1848, and newspapers did write about them, though much less frequently. Most people could not be 
bothered to learn some abstract Communist theory if there had never been a real Communist revolution. 
Marx and Engels often were seen as minor eccentrics. But after 1918, there was a sudden jump in focus on 
Communism. 
Allen (1931) writes of the Big Red Scare period in America:  
“They [Americans] were listening to ugly rumors of a huge radical conspiracy against 
the government and institutions of the United States. They had their ears cocked for the 
detonation of bombs and the tramp of Bolshevist armies. They seriously thought—at least 
millions of them did, millions of otherwise reasonable citizens—that a Red revolution might 
begin in the United States the next month or next week.”19  
Notably, there is a very dramatic story of the sudden advance of communism after World War I, 
and its brutality: the murder of Czar Nicholas II and his entire family by Communists on June 17, 1918. It 
is a particularly repellant story of an internationally recognized family (readers all over the world had seen 
them in photogravures in newspapers and postcards, much as we routinely see the British Royalty today), 
who were asked to dress up, then seated and executed at the surprise appearance of a firing squad. The 
announcement of the Czar’s death appeared in newspapers by June 28, 1918, but not all the gory details 
18 Here, I am rereading the same copy of the book that was assigned to me as an undergraduate at the University of 
Michigan over 50 years ago in Prof. Shaw Livermore’s History 332 course “Individualism vs. Collectivism”  when I was 
19 years old. I still have the same copy of the book, for which I then paid 85 cents new, and I still have my handwritten 
lecture notes from that class. Lest you think, those of you who teach, that your lectures are soon forgotten, note that I 
have been thinking of his lectures and book assignments ever since. The removal rate is sometimes very low. 
19 Allen, 1931, p. 38. 
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were made available to the public until the Report of the Inquiry at Ekaterinburg in September 1920, in the 
middle of the Depression. Then this story – certainly a contagious story, and one that would attract readers - 
was reported in excruciating detail by newspapers around the world. The story lives on today; it persists in 
diminished form as a long, slow epidemic of the kind with low contagion rate but equally low removal rate.  
There was also an oil price shock, which generated its own narratives. U.S. oil prices rose over 50% 
from mid-1919 to the end of 1920, in the middle of the Depression. Because consumer prices were falling 
then, the real price increase was even greater, and by the end of 1920, real oil prices were at the highest 
level in the20th century before 1979.  
Some newspapers did offer a straightforward interpretation of the high oil prices: temporary supply 
disruptions in Russia and Mexico because of unrest there. But, another explanation had a higher contagion 
rate. High oil prices were then attributed to strong demand at a time when automobiles and other energy-
intensive devices were proliferating despite the Depression. An article by W. W. Woods in the Los Angeles 
Times in September 1920 said: “In the last two years the growing appetite of the internal combustion engine 
for gasoline has been more than six times what it was in 1901.”  He concluded that the nation’s oil supply 
would be exhausted in eighteen years. Moreover, coal prices were high in late 1920, and retail stores of coal 
for home furnaces were reportedly exhausted as winter approached. Clayton (2015) documents the history 
of this narrative, from Teddy Roosevelt’s 1908 White House conference on exhaustion of resources, to 
even more dire predictions by May 1920 from David White, chief geologist at the USGS, that oil 
production would peak “probably within five years and possibly in three years.” (In fact, new oil discoveries 
quickly brought the price of oil down after 1920.) 
All of these events – World War, the influenza epidemic, the race riots, the Big Red Scare, the oil 
shock – were associated with hugely unsettling narratives that could have led to a sense of economic 
uncertainty that might have discouraged discretionary spending of households and slowed down hiring 
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decisions of firms around the world. These certainly sound like more significant potential causes than New 
York Fed President Benjamin Strong’s decision to take a cruise when he was needed. 
There were also more subtle narratives that might have brought on the recession. A story was afloat 
in 1920 that the consumer price index would eventually come back down to its level in 1913, just before 
World War I. Not everyone expected this of course, but, obviously, with such deflation expectations, many 
would think one should wait to buy until prices fell, but large numbers of people waiting to buy brought on 
a depression. For those with such deflation expectations, the expected real interest rate was super high. Not 
a single newspaper represented by ProQuest News & Newspapers made any reference at all to real interest 
rates during this depression, even though the concept of the real interest rate had been introduced to 
economists by John Bates Clark (1895). The concept of real interest rate just had not gone viral yet (and 
you might say it still hasn’t). But many people certainly understood why they should postpone buying and 
avoid borrowing when massive deflation is expected.  
 In 1913 in the U.S., a retail price index, predecessor to the Consumer Price Index (CPI), attracted 
great attention. The CPI that we have now began with a base value of 10 in 1913. By 1920, the index had 
doubled to 20, and by mid-1921 it had fallen to 17. The price increase between the end of the war and 
1920 was widely blamed on people who were labeled with the newly-popular word “profiteer.” The Oxford 
English Dictionary gives first use of the word profiteer as occurring in 1912, but its use did not take off until 
late in World War I and after. None of the usual synonyms for profiteer (racketeer, exploiter, black 
marketer, bloodsucker, vampire) seem to have the same meaning and association with wartime fortune 
building at the expense of war heroes. The word is a play on the much older word privateer, meaning a 
pirate who has the support of a hostile government. Wartime narratives spread of customers angry at high 
prices chastising their milkmen and telling their butcher they would stop eating meat altogether to spite 




The popular author Henry Hazlitt wrote in 1920:  
“Hence we have self-righteous individuals on every corner denouncing the outrages 
and robberies committed by a sordid world. The butcher is amazed at the profiteering of the 
man who sells him shoes; the shoe salesman is astounded at the effrontery of the theatre ticket 
speculator; the theatre ticket speculator is staggered at the high-handedness of his landlord; the 
landlord raises his hands to high heaven at the demands of his coal man, and the coal man 
collapses at the prices of the butcher.”20 
U. S. Senator Arthur Capper was reported in January 1920 as saying “Profiteers are more 
dangerous than Reds” and urged consumers to “boycott the profit hogs by refusing to buy goods offered at 
extortionate prices.”21 Perhaps the 1920-21 recession might better be thought of as the 1920-21 consumer 
boycott.  
             
Figure 5.  Frequency of appearance of word “profiteer” by year. For news and newspapers (1900-2016, 
from ProQuest) it is the number of articles with this phrase as a percent of all articles that year. For books 
(1900-2008, from Google Ngrams) it is the number of occurrences of the phrase divided by the total 
number of words in the database for that year, in percent. 
20 Henry Hazlitt, “Profiteers as Public Benefactors,” New York Times, March 21, 1920, p. xxx10.  
21 “Profiteers are Incubators for ‘Reds’—Capper,” Chicago Daily Tribune Jan 25, 1920, p. A9. 
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But it wasn’t just anger at profiteers that curtailed consumption. The story that consumer prices 
would fall dramatically, a story which had good contagion since it was associated with the profiteer narrative, 
was not so much told as intimated thousands of times during the 1920-21 recession when newspapers 
heralded some individual prices that had indeed fallen to 1913 or 1914 levels. This is typical newspaper 
reporting, with writers attempting to make an otherwise marginally interesting story engaging to general 
readers. The newspapers knew that at a time of deflation, readers were responsive to such stories because to 
the untrained mind, it seemed natural that once the war was over, prices would return to their old levels:  
very important to someone trying to decide whether to buy a new house or car.  
   Waiting to buy discretionary items until the prices fell seemed an obvious strategy to many, but 
doing so brought on a depression. As one observer wrote in 1920: “The buying public knows that the war is 
over and has reached the point where it refuses to pay war prices for articles. Goods do not move, for 
people simply will not buy.”22 There was populist anger and protests against profiteering manufacturers and 
retailers. The protests took on moral dimensions: “If people determine to buy foodstuffs or anything else 
only what they actually cannot do without, the working of the inexorable law of supply and demand will 
operate automatically to bring conditions to a more normal state.”23 Thrift became a new virtue. This 1913 
standard was framed as a magical number. In January 1920 the Commissioner of Labor Statistics, Royal 
Meeker, noted that his agency had started its retail price index in 1913 – a date many believed to be a 
grounding point for the price level which would lead them to delay purchases: “The prices we kicked about 
in 1913 have come to be regarded as ideal” but he said that that was a mistaken ideal.  
Apparently, his words did not have immediate impact, and people did indeed hold off buying, out 
of both anger at the narratives of selfish profiteers and the perceived opportunity to profit from postponing 
22 “General Drop in Prices Forecast: Bankers and Traders Expect a Material Reduction in Practically All Lines—Say 
Era of Extravagance Has Passed.” The Christian Science Monitor Sept 25, 1920, p. 4.  
23 “Women Fight High Prices,” The Globe Sept 4, 1920. p. 6. 
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their purchases during a time of falling prices. Both reasons had emotional resonance as the affect heuristic 
would predict, in the wake of the war, the influenza epidemic, and other factors.  
There we have it: a possible narrative-based unconventional explanation – or at least partial 
explanation - for the Depression of 1920-21: substantially a consumer boycott against imagined profiteers, 
based on narratives that made them villains, abetted by a sense of possible personal opportunity to 
postpone buying, or sense of revenge against the profiteers by outsmarting them, in the presence of an affect 
heuristic event driven by other emotion-laden narratives (connected to the World War, the Communist 
revolution, the influenza epidemic, the race riots, the Big Red Scare, the oil shock). Betting on falling 
consumer prices is a speculative bet that can come to an end just as quickly as opinions about the stock 
market change, and in this case, the end came in a little over a year. 
Narratives during the Great Depression of the 1930s 
 
 The Great Depression (which I describe as the whole period 1929 to 1941, including the two 
NBER contractions) is the most long-term severe episode of macroeconomic malfunction in world history. 
And yet we have no received theory why it had such magnitude and duration.  
Some theories of the extreme persistence of the Great Depression not relying on narratives seem 
plausible. Cole and Ohanian (2004) argued that a policy intended to combat the Depression in the United 
States, embodied in the 1934 National Industrial Recovery Act, which imposed “codes of fair competition”, 
prolonged the Depression.  The Act made it easier for businesses to form cartels and more difficult for 
them to cut wages. Although the Supreme Court declared the Act unconstitutional in 1935, Cole and 
Ohanian argue that the Roosevelt administration was able to keep the substance of the codes going anyway. 
 Eichengreen (1996) and Eichengreen and Temin (2000) have argued that the persistence of the 
Great Depression has something to do with an unthinking national commitment to the gold standard, as if it 
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were some kind of God-given virtue, despite changes in labor markets that made wages more downwardly 
rigid. They show that countries which abandoned the gold standard earlier showed better recoveries. 
Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz in their Monetary History of the United States, blamed the 
Great Depression on the Federal Reserve, saying that it was explained by variations in the money supply. It 
was this book that coined the term “quasi-controlled experiment,” anticipating the large number of papers 
we now have under the rubric of “natural experiment”, but the authors didn’t have any such claims at this 
point. Peter Temin put Friedman and Schwartz in a better perspective. The declines in the money supply 
were mostly endogenous, triggered in part by a series of bank runs, caused by the same feedback that 
created the Great Depression, and Friedman and Schwartz were really saying nothing more than that the 
Fed would have done better if they had offset these declines. Temin also observed that Friedman and 
Schwartz indicated no substantial correspondence between the bank runs and measures of economic 
activity. 
Once again, I argue that most likely a multiplicity of factors, whose confluence produced such 
severity, caused people to cut back substantially on their expenditures, and these factors in turn often have 
the form of epidemics of narratives. 
The first narrative of the Great Depression was that of the stock market drop on October 28, 1929. 
This narrative was especially powerful, in its suddenness and severity, focusing public attention on a crash as 
never before in America. These were record one-day drops. But, beyond the record size, it is hard to say 
what made this crash narrative such a success. There was something timed very well about this story, that 
caused an immediate and lasting public reaction.  
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Figure 6.  Frequency of appearance of phrase “stock market crash” by year. For news and newspapers 
(1900-2016, from ProQuest) it is the number of articles with this phrase as a percent of all articles that year. 
For books (1900-2008, from Google Ngrams) it is the number of occurrences of the phrase divided by the 
total number of words in the database for that year, in percent. 
 
The narrative of the crash of 1929 was so strong that it persists today, see Figure 6, though more in 
books than in newspapers. The epidemic actually seems to have begun weakly in 1926, before the actual 
crash of 1929. In newspapers, there have been two fast epidemics, each peaking within a year, implying very 
strong sort-run contagion. The first assumed massive proportions in 1929 with the record 12.8% one-day 
drop in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on October 28, 1929. The second started on October 19, 1987, 
when the Dow had a 22.6% drop, almost doubling the October 28, 1929 drop, though falling short of the 
two-day drop in 1929. It may seem odd that no other stock price movement merited being called a crash 
since 1929. Newspapers are very focused on records, presumably because they know their readers are, and 
1987 was the only record one-day drop after 1929. Folklore suggests that the stock market epidemic had 
extremely high contagion in 1929. We know there was high contagion in 1987. In my own mail 
questionnaire survey in the days following October 19, 1987, I asked when the respondent learned of the 
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1987 crash.  97% of respondents said they learned of it that day, and most of them by midday, meaning 
neither from morning news or evening news, but presumably largely from word of mouth (Shiller 1989).  
The 1987 epidemic looks far stronger than the 1929 one, but it certainly draws its strength from memories 
of 1929, and it may not in fact have been stronger, despite the appearance in Figure 6, given the limitations 
of word counts as measures of narratives. 
Where did the 1929 crash narrative get such strength? Part of the strength in 1929 seems to come 
from certain moralizing. The fact that the 1920s had been not only a time of economic superabundance but 
also of sexual liberation – a morality viewed negatively by some, though they were unable  to make a case 
against it until the new story of the stock market crash appeared. 
Sermons preached on the Sunday after the crash, November 3, 2016, as reported in newspapers 
the following day, took great note of the crash, and attributed it to excesses, moral and spiritual. The 
sermons helped frame a narrative of a sort of day-of-judgment on the “Roaring Twenties.” (Google Ngrams 
shows that the term “roaring twenties” was rarely used in the twenties: the usage of that term first became 
substantial in the 1930s and follows a hump-shaped pattern roughly like the infectives plot in Figure 2, not 
peaking until the early 1960s.)  
It helps to listen to these people’s narratives from the time of the Great Depression in their own 
words, R. G. D. Allen in Only Yesterday, 1931, spoke of a more modest countenance: 
“…striking alterations in the national temper and ways of American life... One could 
hardly walk a block in any American City or town without noticing some of them.”24  
Rita Weiman, an author and actress, described the change too, in 1932: 
“During those years of inflation, when we were right on the edge of a precipice all the 
time, we lost our sense of perspective. We spent fabulous sums for objects and pleasures out 
of all proportion to the value received. If it cost a great deal of money, we promptly came to 
the conclusion that they must be good….Take the matter of home entertainment. Many of us 
had almost forgotten how much fun it can be to gather friends around one’s own table. Any 
number of us suffered from ‘restaurant digestion.’” 25  
24 Allen [1931] p. 289. 
25Bird, Carol. “We’re getting ‘ANCHORED’ Again Says Rita Weiman.” Washington Post: July 10, 1032, p. SM3  
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Catherine Hackett, another writer in 1932, explained her view of the new morality in the Great 
Depression: 
“In the old Boom era I could buy a jar of bath salts or an extra pair of evening slippers 
without an uncomfortable consciousness of the poor who lacked the necessities of life. I could 
always reflect happily on the much-publicized day laborers who wore silk shirts and rode to 
their work in Fords. Now it was different. The Joneses were considered to be callous to 
human misery if they continued to give big parties and wear fine clothes.”26 
 
 Another narrative at the beginning of the Great Depression was that of a repeat of the 1920-21 
event - no more distant in their memories than the events of 2007-9 are to our memories today. Since many 
must have expected prices to fall, as they did before in 1920-21, they would want to delay their purchases 
until the price decline was complete. Economists naturally expected the contraction to be as short lived as in 
1920-21, which helps explain why President Hoover and others confidently explained that it would be over 
soon. But the public didn’t necessarily believe President Hoover. Catherine Hackett wrote:    
“I have read enough predictions by economists to convince me that my guess is as 
good as anyone’s on the future trend of prices. A housewife plays the falling commodity 
market just as an investor plays the falling stock market; she sits tight and waits for prices to 
settle before buying anything but actual necessities. But I do not need to be an economist to 
realize that if all the twenty million housewives do that, business recovery will be indefinitely 
delayed.”27 
I have displayed this quote here as originally worded in 1932 because it illustrates some aspects of 
consumer behavior then that may not be remembered and appreciated. She finds similarity in consumer 
behavior to the behavior of stock market speculators, who put their own emotional energy into forming 
their own personal forecast for the individual stock prices, not trusting experts, as well as the high contagion 
of narratives about such speculation. Women must have been talking like speculators, telling stories about 
some smart decisions and some mistakes with their shopping successes and failures. This must often have 
been about the second moment of consumer price changes. Even if average expectations for inflation were 
26 Hackett, Catherine. “Why We Women Won’t Buy.” Forum and Century. December 1932, p. 343. 
27 Hackett 1932 op. cit. 
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nonnegative, it is plausible if there was a higher contagion rate for emotionally-laden narratives about the 
price decline scenario, there could be significant net decrement to consumer spending.  
It is curious that economists haven’t looked more at testimonies of women to understand the 
consumption function. Even when, maybe especially when, prices are rising rapidly, women must have been 
talking extensively about strategizing their shopping around their hunches. Apparently then, especially as sex 
roles were more strongly divided than they are today, it was men’s business to play the stock market and 
women’s business to manage the shopping, except perhaps around 1929 when women were notoriously 
getting into the stock market speculation game.28 
So, there were attempts again to create a moral imperative against betting on falling prices, against 
women’s behavior that was analogous to that of the generally male short sellers on the stock market. The 
Washington D.C. Chamber of Commerce launched a campaign in 1930 with the slogan “Buy Now for 
Prosperity.” A “Prosperity Committee” sought the participation of clergymen of all denominations to 
“preach prosperity through their pulpits” and thereby to “stimulate production, relieving the unemployment 
situation.”29 
In 1932, the depths of the Depression, a Mrs. Charles E. Foster reportedly told a women’s group: 
“One of the most effective weapons in the hands of American women today is their 
tremendous purchasing power. We are told that they spend eighty-five percent of the incomes 
of the United States. How could they better create public opinion in favor of spending as usual 
than by setting the example themselves?”30 
 Even as it happened, the contraction was thought of popularly as the product of some kind of 
feedback. In his 1933 inaugural address, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt summed it up with the words 
“the only thing to fear is fear itself,” describing people as responding with fear to others’ fear. This quote is 
28 John Jacob Raskob. 1929. “Everybody Ought to Get Rich.” Ladies Home Journal. 
29“Buy-Now Campaign Started in Capital,” The Washington Post, Oct 25, 1930, p. 7.  
30“Jersey Clubwomen Urged to Arouse Public Opinion in Favor of Spending” New York Herald Tribune, Feb 7, 1932, 




                                                     
widely remembered today; his fireside chat has developed into a powerful slow narrative, in contrast to 
Hackett’s, which does not quite describe an emotion of fear. 
Roosevelt also offered moral reasons to spend. Days after his inauguration in 1933, President 
Roosevelt took the unusual step of addressing the nation on the radio  at a time of a massive national bank 
run that had necessitated shutting all the banks down. In this “fireside chat” he explained the banking crisis 
and asked people not to continue their demands on banks. He spoke to the nation as a military 
commander would speak to his troops before a battle, asking for their courage and selflessness. Roosevelt 
asserted “You people must have faith. You must not be stampeded by rumors or guesses. Let us unite in 
banishing fear.”31 His personal request to the nation stuck: it ended the bank run, money flowed into, not 
out of, the banks when they were reopened. The narrative of this first fireside chat is still with us today, and 
every president starting with President Ronald Reagan has offered regular chats on the radio on Saturdays, 
but the narrative has not been powerful enough, or not used well enough, to prevent recessions. 
 The macro storyline in the Great Depression gradually morphed into a national revulsion against 
the excesses and pathological confidence of the Roaring Twenties. Other narratives focused on the rising 
leftist or Communist movement that was seen as potentially influencing future government policy far 
beyond the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), the new deal institution to support fair prices. The 
NIRA was perceived as only one example of the interference with business that might come eventually. 
 The worst days of the Great Depression, in 1932 and 1933, were haunted by scary narratives 
coming from Europe and Asia. Japan had just occupied Manchuria in 1931. In the Soviet Union in 1932-
33, The Holodomor, the ethnic-Ukrainian version of the Holocaust, was raging in the form of a man-made 
famine - Stalin’s attempt to stifle dissent which cost millions of lives. These narratives, with hindsight 
sounding like some of the worst narratives of World War II to come, were widely circulated in the West. In 
31 Roosevelt Fireside Chat No. 1 March 12, 1933 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r6nYKRLOFWg 
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January 1933, Hitler seized power in Germany and quickly began murdering his political opponents and 
terrorizing Jews. 
These narratives were good reasons for anxiety that might encourage many to cancel their plans for 
frivolous spending: a larger house or a new car, in order to feel they had sufficient savings. Some of these 
events also brought moral reasons not to spend. There were many boycotts:  against German and Japanese 
goods as well as against goods associated with Jewish people. Germans began boycotting western goods. 
These actions must have had some economic effect. 
 Franklin Allen’s 1931 book, Only Yesterday, seemed to get closer to understanding the real cause 
of the Great Depression, in terms of the stories of the time, and the book has motivated my thinking ever 
since I first read it. The book may seem superficial in a sense: just a collection of stories with no organizing 
theme except at the end. However, through understanding all those stories of fads and crazes, one gets a 
view of what was happening in the 1920s. One reviewer of Allen’s book in 1931 explained what he learned 
from the book: “Of course, we change fads. That is the essence of our changelessness - that we plunge from 
one craze to another with kaleidoscopic ease.”32  
Contagion rates for stories of business failures, rather than inspirational stories, were naturally high 
at a time when a large fraction of the population were unemployed. Stories abounded of business people 
committing suicide.33  
It seemed to most people in the late depression that there was an inevitable trend towards 
government control of business. A May 1939 poll asked, “Do you think that ten years from now there will 
be more government control of business than there is now or less government control of business?” 56% of 
the respondents said more; 22% less; 8% neither; 14% had no opinion (Higgs 1997). 
32 Lewis Gannett, “Books & Things,” New York Herald Tribune, Dec 1, 1931 p. 19. 
33“Rise in Suicide Rate Laid to Depression: National Survey Shows 20.5 of 100,000 People Took Their Lives in 1931—
Highest Figure since 1915, New York Times, June 23, 1939, p. 24.  
41 
 
                                                     
By the 1930s, the theory that Communist forces in America were massing forces into an inevitable 
future direction for America was a story everyone knew, whether they liked it or not. The increasing 
radicalization of President Roosevelt plays a part in these stories: in 1936, speaking of the magnates of 
organized money, he said “I welcome their hatred.” (Higgs 1997). 
 The Communist conspiracy narrative, from the late 1930s, included anecdotes about increasingly 
leftist labor laws stymying business. Stories circulated of outside-agitator unions disrupting peaceful 
companies whose employees were happy with their jobs; of strangers picketing and coordinated refusals of 
other unions to handle the company’s products; of the existing employees forming their own union to try to 
stave off the attack, and the radical National Labor Relations Board throwing it out as a “company union.”34  
One of the stories that was circulating in the United States during the Great Depression was that of 
Lázaro Cárdenas, the president of Mexico, 1934-40. Just as in the United States, the Depression amplified 
calls for socialist or communist solutions in Mexico, which put fear in the hearts of businesspeople. 
Cárdenas expropriated land from the commercial haciendas and in 1938 nationalized the Mexican oil 
industry and railroads. These actions were seen as a model for what might happen in other countries, and 
indeed nationalizations in other countries did follow Cárdenas’ example, though not in the United States. 
A huge rise in policy uncertainty in both the U.S. and the U.K. was revealed by the Economic 
Policy Uncertainty Index of Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis, which is based on counts 
of words in online news media. 




                                                     
Narratives Leading Up to the “Great Recession” 2007-9 
The 2007-9 world financial crisis has been called the “Great Recession” as a reference to the “Great 
Depression” of the 1930s. Certainly, the narrative of the Great Depression was suddenly thrust into the 
national attention as never before, not since the 1930s, see Figure 7.    
  
      
Figure 7.  Frequency of appearance of phrase “Great Depression” by year. For news and newspapers (1900-
2016, from ProQuest) it is the number of articles with this phrase as a percent of all articles that year. For 
books (1900-2008, from Google Ngrams) it is the number of occurrences of the phrase (capitalized) divided 
by the total number of words in the database for that year, in percent. 
 
The figure suggests far more attention was paid in 2009 to the Great Depression than during the 
Great Depression itself, though one must be careful to understand that people hadn’t really named it the 
Great Depression yet as it happened. They certainly had Depression-linked narratives, associated with 
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words unusual to that period, such as breadline, a word that Google Ngrams shows grew rapidly in use in 
books from 1929 to 1934, and decayed fairly steadily ever since.  
The interest in the Great Depression in 2009 is confirmed in Google Trends search counts as well, 
though not as dramatically as in Figure 7. This does not mean that people were suddenly more interested in 
Franklin Roosevelt or The New Deal. Counts show virtually no increase in interest in these details of 
history. It was more just a quick and easy way to communicate narrative: we have passed, by 2007, a 
euphoric speculative immoral period like the Roaring Twenties, the stock market and banks are collapsing 
in 2008 as around 1929, and now the economy might really collapse again like that; we might even be 
unemployed and on the street crowding around failed banks, yes really! End of basic narrative. 
Consider a narrative-based chronology of the 2007-9 financial crisis. Financial crises are driven by a 
cadence of stories. For example, stories about bank runs were in the 19th century virtually synonymous with 
financial crises. But after the Great Depression bank runs were thought to be cured. The Northern Rock 
bank run in 2007, the first U.K. bank run since 1866, brought back the old narratives of panicked 
depositors forming angry crowds outside closed banks. The story led to a skittishness internationally, and to 
the Washington Mutual (WaMu) bank run a year later in the U.S., and, then, the Reserve Prime Fund run 
a few days after that in 2008. These events then led to the very unconventional U.S. government guarantee 
of all U.S. money market funds for a year. Apparently, governments were aware that they could not let the 
old story of a bank run go live over concern for its effects on public anxiety. 
 A narrative approach to understanding the crisis might take us back further in time. In 2001, the 
U.K. television show “Property Ladder” was launched. This reality TV show which depicted individuals 
buying homes, fixing and prettifying them a little, and then reselling them at a large profit, was a big success. 
Successful narratives are copied with appropriate changes and launched anew in other countries. The U.S. 
TV show “Flip that House” attempted to replicate Property Ladder in 2005, but it was canceled at the time 
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of the financial crisis in 2008. Property Ladder lasted until 2009, renaming itself Property Snakes and 
Ladders, until its demise later that year. 
Leading up to the Great Recession 2007-9, and setting the stage for it, were widespread fears of 
long-term job insecurity because of advancing technology. Facebook and Gmail appeared in 2004, 
YouTube in 2005, Twitter in 2006, and the I-Phone in 2007. These were the prominent business stories of 
the time, and they may have left the impression that the companies that were forming might not be creating 
jobs for those not technologically gifted or connected with other such people.  
The very name “Great Recession” could be interpreted as evidence of a narrative epidemic. 
Naming the financial crisis after the Great Depression was not the choice of any one individual. There had 
been earlier attempts to attach the name “Great Recession” to preceding recessions. Otto Eckstein wrote a 
book entitled The Great Recession in 1978 that attempted to attach this name to the severe 1974-75 
recession. However, the name did not stick. Again in the 1981-82 recession this term was used by Joseph 
Granville, the flamboyant analyst who stirred much talk about his prediction of stock market drops by 
engaging in stunts such as appearing at events with a trained chimpanzee.35 But again, the name did not go 
viral. It was different, however, in 2007-9. Nouriel Roubini first referred to the “Great Recession of 2007” in 
late 2006, a year before the recession had started.36 But it took several more years, until 2009, for the term 
to catch on and go viral. 
The Great Depression of the 1930s has long been associated in the public mind with the “stock 
market crash of 1929” that preceded it. Most people appear to be wary of attaching grandiose names to 
events, unless there is authority justifying that. Lionel Robbins was successful with his book title, The Great 
Depression in 1934 because President Roosevelt, a generally recognized authority, had used the words37, 
suggesting the worst economic contraction ever. It is conceivable that naming the event thus might have 
35 “Granville: Market Heading for another ‘Massacre’” The Atlanta Constitution, January 1, 1982, p. 2C.  
36 http://search.proquest.com/news/docview/222625882/EE9DE487B6184667PQ/1?accountid=15172 
37 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, during his first election campaign, September 20, 1932, “how heavily the hand of the 
great depression has fallen upon this Western country” (transcript in New York Herald Tribune, Sept 21, 1932. p. 6.  
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been a self-fulfilling prophecy in that it created worries and uncertainty, perhaps contributing to the 
persistence of a depressed economy.  
What is it about the 2007-9 event that made the name “Great Recession” suddenly contagious? 
Judging from the peak U.S. unemployment rate, it was less severe than the 1981-2 recession.  
Perhaps it was because the 2007-9 event fit the most generic and ill-informed memories of the 
Great Depression. People remember massive bank failures as part of the Great Depression story, and that 
was a better fit, it appeared, with the events of 2007. In the 1981-82 recession the stock market had not 
been booming (it had never recovered from the 1974-5 crash, which still seemed like a recent major event 
in 1981), and the stock market did not fall below its 1980 value by 1982. In contrast, 2007-9 saw a near 
halving of the market from very high levels. People in 1981-82 were, as public opinion polls confirm, 
preoccupied with out-of-control consumer-price inflation, and saw the events in terms of a suddenly strong 
central bank effort to contain the inflation.  
Psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s representativeness heuristic is the principle 
that people judge current events by their similarity to memories of representative events. The Great 
Depression was a model that is exaggerated in people’s minds because of its legendary status.  In 2007-09 
presidents and prime ministers invoked parallels to the Great Depression to justify their requests to apply 
stimulus. Did this contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy, a mirror event to the Great Depression, albeit not 
as severe? Indeed, the name says it all, the Great Recession, not quite the Great Depression.  
Narratives in 2017 and the Outlook for the Economy Today 
 The narratives from the 2007-2009 financial crisis have faded in our memories, but are still alive 
and still relevant. But, for now, the U.S. national attention has shifted quite dramatically away from that 
mode of thought. 
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President-elect Donald J. Trump is a master of narratives. His narratives have become highly 
inspirational for some, as was seen by the tens of thousands who came to his campaign rallies. They have 
become a source of alarm for others.  
His remarkable success in the presidential election campaign last year may be attributed to, among 
other things, his public persona from his lifelong effort to promote himself as a business genius able to 
make hard decisions and strike deals. An important reason for his contagion is his reality television show, 
The Apprentice, which focused lavish attention on Trump.  That show was such a  success that it was 
copied in numerous other countries each with their own home-grown Trump substitute, some of whom 
went on to achieve their own political success,  notably João Doria, elected mayor of Sao Paulo, Brazil, in 
2016.38   
 History does not suggest that even a politician as skilled as Trump can actually control the 
progression of the narratives he created. The manner in which these narratives unfold will play an important 
role in any economic forecast.  To best predict economic activity, we need, among other things, to watch the 
narratives and ask: how will the emerging twists in the narratives affect propensity to spend, to start 
unconventional new businesses, to hire new employees? In short, how will the animal spirits be affected?   
Trump’s example and admonition to “think big and live large” (Trump and McIver, 2004) appears 
to provide inspiration to many of his admirers, and that might well be expected, along with his stimulative 
tax policy, to boost consumption demand as well as entrepreneurial zeal. Many people might take the 
Trump story as a script for themselves, and thus spend freely and raise their risk tolerance.  





                                                     
But we also have to take into account the Trump detractors, about as many as his admirers, who 
may be thinking more along the lines of the morality play of the 1930s. Predicting aggregate demand from 
the new Trump narratives requires some careful attention to conflicting narratives.  
Incorporating such factors into economic forecasts is not impossible. We would benefit, however, 
from more research into understanding the role of narratives in the economy. 
Opportunities for Researchers in Narrative Economics 
 
Narrative economics, to the extent that it has ever been practiced by scholars, has had a poor 
reputation. In part, it may be due to the fact that the relation between narratives and economic outcomes is 
likely to be complex and time varying. The impact of narratives on the economy is regularly mentioned in 
journalistic circles, but without the demands of academic rigor. The impact of journalistic accounts of 
narratives may have been connected to aggressive forecasts which often proved wrong. But, the advent of 
big data and of better algorithms of semantic search might bring more credibility to the field. 
Research in economics is already on its way to finding better quantitative methods to understand 
the impact of narratives on the economy. Textual search is a small but expanding area in economic 
research. A search of the NBER working paper database finds less than one hundred papers with the words 
“textual analysis.”  Textual analysis has been used by economists, for example, to document changes in 
party affiliation (Kuziemko and Washington, 2015); political polarization (Gentzkow et al. 2016); and news 
and speculative price movements (Roll 1988; Boudoukh et al. 2013). But much more could be done. The 
historical analysis could be carried further into databases of personal diaries, sermons, personal letters, 
psychiatrists’ patient notes and social media. 
There should be more serious efforts at collecting further time series data on narratives, going 
beyond the passive collection of others’ words, towards experiments that reveal meaning and psychological 
significance. Since 1989, I have been collecting some such data, on questionnaires about stock prices and 
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home prices, with open-ended questions that invite the respondent to write a sentence or two. The 
questions are designed to stimulate the respondent to think about what is motivating them, so that their 
responses can be analyzed in posterity. However, I would advocate for there to be resources devoted to 
collecting data about narratives and public reactions and understandings of narratives on a serious scale. It 
could be done with focus groups and social media.  
But this research still today needs improvement in tracking and quantifying narratives. Researchers 
have trouble dealing with a set of often-conflicting narratives and gradations and superposition of them. 
Even the simplest epidemic model shows that no narratives reach everyone, and whom a particular 
narrative reaches and whom it does not is largely random.  The meanings of words depend on context and 
change through time. The real meaning of a story, which accounts for its virality, may also change through 
time and is hard to track in the long run.  
There are serious issues of inferring causality, distinguishing between narratives that are associated 
with economic behavior just because they are reporting on the behavior, and narratives that create changes 
in economic behavior. These issues are not insurmountable.39  
Researchers have to grapple with issues that have troubled literary theorists. Those theorists who, as 
noted above, try to list the basic stories in all of literature, have to try to distill what it is that defines these 
stories, what makes them contagious. There are so very many contagious stories at any time in history, and 
it is hard to sort through them. The theorists run the risk of focusing on details of the stories that are 
common just because the events are actually familiar in everyday life. They also face the difficulty of 
accounting for changes through time in the list of stories.  
 39 For example, Chen et al. (2016) compute a “propagation score” of narrative contagion based on citations 
and citations within citations. Such measures relate to the contagion importance of narratives beyond the 
mere count of numbers of mention. 
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Research in semantic information and semiotics is advancing. For example, machine translation is 
already somewhat able to pick which meaning of the word is intended by looking at context, at other 
adjacent words. Semantic search took a big leap forward in 2010 when Apple, Inc. introduced its Siri 
function, which allows users to verbally ask a question like “What is the longest river in South Africa?” and 
receive a direct verbal answer. Semantic search is now getting well established around the world.  
Semantic search may, however, take a long time to reach the abilities of the human mind to 
understand narratives. In the meantime, researchers can still be quantitative in the study of narratives if they 
use multiple research assistants with explicit instructions to read narratives and to classify and quantify them 
for their essential emotional driving force. Advances in psychology, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence 
may be relied on to improve our sense of structure in narrative economics. 
As research methods advance, and as more social media data accumulate, textual analysis will be a 
stronger field in economics in coming years. It may allow us to move beyond 1930s-style models of 
feedback, the “multiple rounds of expenditure,” and get closer to all the kinds of feedback that really drive 
economic events. And it will help us to better understand the kinds of deliberate manipulations and 
deceptions we have been suffering under, and to formulate some positive economic policies that take into 
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